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H. MARCUS PRICE III*

Interrelationship of the
Behavioral Sciences and Law
in International Crisis Decision
Making: An Analysis of "The
Torrey Canyon Incident"

as a Model
The interrelationship of available behavioral science techniques in crisis
situations of significant legal import has not been adequately reviewed by the
legal community. This is particularly true in the context of private international
crises. Most of the available literature pertains to "war-peace" crises (i.e.
Cuban crisis, Suez crisis, Cyprus crisis, and the controversial role of the U.N. in
the Congo). While of extreme importance, these issues are unlikely to fall within
the realm of most practitioners of private international law. These social science
tools are also of use to the international attorney in the private international
arena.
For the purpose of this paper, the consequences emanating from the collision
of a petroleum tanker has been used as a model. In the period from 1965 to 1970
over 94 tankers had foundered. Further, the economic infrastructure of
supertanker transportation insures its continued use. The 1956 Suez Canal
crisis provided initiative to invest in giant tankers to navigate the Cape passage.
Additional capital investment has been made in the dredging of expanded,
deeper channels, such as Europoort near Rotterdam. 1
Pollution and the use of supertankers are issues of considerable topical
interest. Accordingly, the analysis of an incident of this type in a social science
context should be demonstrative of the interrelationship, and usefulness, of the
social sciences to the legal environment.
The Torrey Canyon incident is a fairly well documented factual situation
involving a definite international crisis of great commercial and legal interest
with high saliency to the decision-making bodies and a limited time factor in
which decisions had to be made. Accordingly, it appears reasonable the actions
taken by the decision makers in the incident will provide an excellent model for

*Legal Counsel to Gulf General Atomic Europe; B.A., Central Missouri State University (1965),
J.D., Ohio State University (1967), LL.M., Foreign Trade & Investment, University of Missouri
(1971); Lecturer on International Agreements, Rockhurst College and U.S. Department of
Commerce; Member of U.S. Export Expansion Council, U.S. Dept. of Commerce; Member,
Florida and Missouri Bars and International Bar Association.
'O'LoUGHLIN, THE ECONOMICS OF SEA TRANSPORT (1967) pp. 124, 168.
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many of the theories and hypotheses contained in the literature on crisis
decision making.
As this area as applied to the international arena is largely undeveloped, the
purpose of this paper is to assist in establishing the validity of the application of
the currently resolved theories to an actual international fact situation. The
methods used to make this application were to first make an exhaustive search
of available periodical information in order to define the factual setting as fully
as possible, a review of the existing applicable literature in the field, and an
ultimate comparison of the factual situation against the reasonably anticipated
actions of the British Government and three selected peripheral international
actors as projected by the literature. To the best of the author's knowledge,
there are no comparable works on this particular topic.
The underlying hypothesis of this paper, that the circumstances and
decision-making processes within the legal framework surrounding the Torrey
Canyon incident conform to anticipated patterns as predicted in psychological
analyses of crisis decision-making situations, was resolved from the factual crisis
situation, the organizational structure of the decision makers, the limited
alternatives considered by the British Government, and the flurry of
international reaction as a consequence of the incident.
This paper is limited in several facets. First, there is a lack of information
regarding the personalities of the individual decision makers involved. This is a
significant factor and its absence detracts from the validity of the paper.
Second, although the particular decisions made by the respective organizations
are known, there is a definite lack of information regarding the specific
decision-making processes involved in this situation within the structural
context of each particular organization.
The author was forced to rely on surmise, as opposed to established fact, in
defining the existing decision-making processes. Third, the author was forced to
rely on mass media periodicals for much of the factual material. The
authenticity of this type of publication is often questionable. However, such
periodicals proved to be the major source of factual information in this
situation.
Last, and significantly, the literature within the psychological discipline
regarding crisis decision making in the international arena is confined to the
work of only a few scholars. Accordingly, the theories considered represent the
work of a very limited number of students of the psychology of the international
arena.
After the author's hypothesis was tested in the above described manner, it
was discovered that the actions of the British Government did fall within the
anticipated pattern, but that the actions of the peripheral international actors
studied were somewhat other than what would have been anticipated by a study
of the relevant literature, although these latter deviations are probably due to
InternationalLawyer, VoL 8, No. 2
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the difficulty in applying the particular disciplinary material in this limited
aspect as opposed to constituting absolute deviations from anticipated behavior
patterns. The available techniques proved of sufficient validity to be of
substantial use to the legal practitioner in the international arena.
Construction of the Torrey Canyon was completed in Newport News, Virginia
in March, 1959. She was built to a capacity of 118,285 deadweight cargo tons. 2
The vessel was built under rigid specifications and would have passed muster on
a physical basis under the maritime laws of any country. 3 Although the Torrey
Canyon was considerably above average in cargo capacity, she was by no means
in the "super tanker" class which includes vessels with capacities in excess of
4
326,000 deadweight tons.
She was owned by the Barracuda Tanker Corporation of Bermuda and was
chartered by Barracuda to the Union Oil Company of California.
Union Oil Company of California in turn chartered the vessel on a single
voyage charter basis, to British Petroleum Company, Ltd. of Great Britain. 5
Pursuant to common international maritime practice, the Torrey Canyon was
registered under a Liberian flag of necessity. 6
On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon left Kuwait for Milford Haven,
Wales, with a cargo of 117,000 tons of crude oil. She steered on a collision
course for the treacherous Seven Stones Reef which lies 15 miles west of Land's
End, Cornwall. She maintained course for 20 miles without malfunction of
automatic pilot, and the experts conclude that the automatic pilot must simply
have been erroneously set through a basic navigational error. 7 A Liberian Board
of Investigation subsequently determined the collision to be the result of human
error, not mechanical malfunction. 8
After the first impact with the reef and initial rescue attempts, the vessel lost
40,000 to 50,000 tons of oil. The remainder of her cargo, approximately 60,000
to 70,000 tons, remained intact in "honeycomb-type" compartments located in
the hold of the vessel. 9 This was the situation with which the British
Government was faced, and with which the test was made of the existing
literature on international crisis decision making.
A definition of two integral terms is in order before commencing the analysis.

'The New York Times, April 1, 1967, at C7.
'The Times (London), April 4, 1967, at 2.
'In theOily Wake ofa TragedyAt Sea, U.S. NEWS
'The Times (London), April 5, 1967, at 5.

AND WORLD REPORT,

April 10, 1967, at 118.

pp. 7.24. (1962).
'New York Times, April 2, 1967, § 4, at 2.
'The Torrey Canyon, 1967 A.M.C. 569, 576: I.M.C.O. Preliminary Report to an International
Sub-Committee ("Torrey Canyon") of the International Maritime Committee (Aug. 25, 1967).
'Cowan, op. cit., supra, at 103.
IBOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY,
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For purposes of this paper, the definition of "organizational international
crisis" espoused by Charles F. Hermann is utilized. 10 Three elements are
required: a perceived threat to highly salient goals of the organization; a
relatively short time period in which to take action; a factor of surprise or
unpreparedness on the part of the organizational decision maker. The term
"decision" is defined as any act which is a commitment to carry out a specified
task, to take on the responsibilities of a social role, or to execute a specified
course of action in the future. 11
As stated in Hermann, Crises in ForeignPolicy, supra, saliency, or a threat to
a high priority value of the organization must be present. The emphasis here is
on the perception of the decision maker of a threat to its salient values or goals.
The decision maker must arrive at a policy decision by assessing the facts as they
appear at a particular moment in time. Its action must be guided by
perception. 12
The first study is of the British Government. In the situation at hand, there is
clearly a highly salient threat perceived by the British Government. Both the
loose, free-floating oil, and the petroleum remaining within the tanker,
presented a direct threat to bird and marine life, which in fact ultimately caused
the death of over 100,000 birds alone. 13 There was an immediate danger of a
total loss of approximately $3 million worth of oyster beds along the Cornwall
coast. 14
The threat of the oil also presented an inhibiting effect on the $350,000,000
annual gross tourist trade in the Cornwall coast resorts. Is
The crucial time factor is apparent as all of the above salient threats were
immediate and required prompt action. It is also self-evident that the very
nature of the calamity would prevent any anticipation of the crisis by the
decision makers. Furthermore, the organizational structure of the British
Government insures that the officials were not inclined to worry about things
that may happen in the future due to intrastructural pressures and
preoccupation with existent, rather than potential, issues. 16
If the decision makers' goals are clear-cut and uniform, a quick, incisive
decision is more likely to be made than in a situation where the goals may tend
to conflict. Not only did the British Government have to contend with
0
1 C.F. HERMANN, CRISIS IN FOREIGN POLICY, 29, (The Bobs Merrill Company, Inc., 1969);
C.F. HERMANN, Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations, 8 AD.
Sci. Q. 61 (June, 1963), at 64.
"I.L. Janis, DecisionalConflicts: A TheoreticalAnalysis, 3 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1959), 6.

"STAGNER,

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (Brooks/Cole Publishing

Co., 1967), 5-7.
3
' NEWSWEEK, Britian's Great Ghastly Ooze, Apr. 10, 1967, at 51.
"U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, April 10, 1967, at 18.
'"Times (London), March 13, 1967, at 3.
'JOSEPH DE RIVERA, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY

(Charles E. Merrill

Publishing Co., 1968), 60.
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anticipations of utilitarian goals or losses but also with the potential approval
17
and disapproval of certain reference groups.
Here, the British Government had the immediate goal of protecting its
economic interests in terms of damage prevention in the most expeditious and
efficient possible manner. By the same token, the decision makers did not wish
to raise the ire of the American and British shipping and insurance interests
involved which might prove to have a subsequent detrimental effect on its own
maritime and industrial interests through retaliatory legal actions, international
economic sanctions, or limiting of trade to Great Britain through governmental
or private entities.
Further, injudicious release of the oil would probably contaminate the waters
of adjacent nations, notably France which would have the potential of giving
rise to interesting legal and jurisdictional issues of the liability of a state to
permit pollutants and resultant injury to impact on an adjacent sovereignty. 18
To complicate the problem, the British populace made its displeasure known
and demanded prompt remedial and punitive action. Thousands of private
volunteers commenced cleaning beaches, unwary dogs, and over a thousand sea
birds per day. 19 This type of conflicting goals situation is anticipated to
influence the British organizational decision makers to accept somewhat
20
delusory ideas of the nature of the crisis and its potential solutions.
Accordingly in the light of the conflicting goals one could assume the British
Government would definitely take action to protect Britain's interests but
simultaneously attempt less than totally effective measures in the hopes of
avoiding harming its own, and foreign, maritime and economic and property
interests.
In this situation of stress the decisions are likely to be considered in a
sequential manner, not rationally viewing all reasonable alternatives but
restricting the choice of alternatives to a limited number of affirmative actions.
As stated in de Rivera, supra, the relative importance of immediacy as opposed
to long-term costs will create a tendency to grasp at short-term, readily available
solutions instead of considering the consequences of such alternatives. Stress
may lead an individual to assign to the situation any meaning that will allow him
to act.
de Rivera develops this theory further when applying it in the context-of an
organizational decision maker. First it is considered that the individual's beliefs
are anchored in what the group perceives as real. If one wishes to be taken
seriously, he has to accept largely the reality in which others are operating and
"Janis, Decisional Conflicts, supra note 11, at 14.
"See In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941): 33 id., 182 (1939).
"The Times (London), April 6, 1967, at 4.
0
' STAGNER, op. cit., supra note 12, at 110.
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thus the individual in the organization begins to think and perceive in consensus
terms. The organization will "view" as reality whatever will help establish a
consensus.
Accordingly, there is a reinforcement of the loaded, sequential consideration
of utilitarian alternatives, but the very organizational structure in which such
decisions are made incline the decisions considered to be limited. 21 In
addition, not only are the considered alternatives fewer, but in the crisis
situation a nation's decision makers are more likely to accept one of the first
22
satisfying alternatives that occurs in a crisis situation.
Accordingly, under the existing facts, and the theories as applied, one could
anticipate a limited consideration of sequential utilitarian alternatives which
would initially be perceived by the decision maker to be as least harmful to the
shipping interests as possible, and therefore, likely to have little remedial effect,
and to become progressively more stringent as the ineffectiveness of the initial
alternatives become apparent, and as outraged public opinion becomes morm
vocal.
In fact, this was exactly what happened. First, the British Government
attempted to pump the oil remaining in the Torrey Canyon into other vessels
afloat just outside the dangerous reef, in an attempt to lighten the vessel in
order to float it from the reef. This was perceived to be less injurious to Britain's
maritime industrial interests, to protect existing property rights, to avoid legal
claims, and to present a potential solution to the pollution problem.
However, high winds and seas soon presented a direct threat to the rescue
vessels and this solution was reluctantly dismissed after an eight-day trial. 2 3 On
March 26, 1967, a Dutch salvage tugboat, the Utrecht, was utilized in an
attempt to pull the Torrey Canyon off the reef and thereby still salvage the vessel
and attempt to remove at least part of the pollution threat. In fact, this effort
preceded the splitting of the ship into several sections, which sections
immediately began to sink. 24 It is disputed as to whether the actions of the tug
caused the split. 25
Although portions of the ship which had sunk remained airtight and the oil in
those sections was not a danger to any of the aforementioned British interests,
the British Government foresaw this destruction of the vessel as a final removal
of the conflicting obstacle with the maritime and financial interests and
perceived its path clear to attempt the destruction of the remainder of the vessel
and the igniting of the remaining oil in an attempt to burn the petroleum off the
sea.
supra note 16, at 27-60.
"Kelman, Decision Making in InternationalPolitics, Chapter 12,
457 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965).
"The Times, April 10, 1967, at 7.
"New York Times, March 27, 1967, at 1.
"Cowan, op. cit., supra, at 95.
21DE RIVERA,

INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR,
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Accordingly, on March 28, 1967, at the urging of the Royal Navy, the British
Government ordered the bombing of the Torrey Canyon and the free floating
oil in an attempt to ignite it. This bombing attempt was effected through the use
of high explosive bombs, aviation fuel and napalm. The entire attempt was
completed by March 31, 1967.26 The bombing attempt proved of doubtful
success and the government then attempted to disperse the oil with a detergent
which ultimately proved more harmful than the free floating oil. 27 As early as
1965, authorities had been warned not to use chemicals to clean up oil spills
near shell fish beds by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
The attempted, alleged improper, destruction of the oil and the vessel was in
fact an issue in contention by the insurers at the time settlement was concluded
28
However, the
and was a factor in the ultimate 7 million dollar settlement.
British Crown has long enjoyed an expanded interpretation of the
reasonableness of its action to protect British soil, particularly on the high seas:
His Majesty's Government accepts the view that no State can be expected to tolerate
with equanimity circumstances arising under which, owing to peculiar local
circumstances, the absence of jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas
immediately contiguous to its territorial waters may prejudice gravely the enforcement
29
of the laws or the well-being of the community within its territory.

Another potential issue arose from the remedial measures taken in that the
released oil reached French shores on April 9, 1967. The French expended 158
million francs, the services of 3,000 French troops, and thousands of volunteers
to combat the oil. 30 However, no claim against England was raised by France,
although France did initiate its own actions against the owners and charterers of
the Torrey Canyon through arrest of a sister ship at Rotterdam.
In order to make a valid assessment of the effect that crisis played in the
sequential utilitarian alternative selection, available alternatives that the British
Government might have considered and failed to do so must be present as
otherwise the British Government may merely have actually exhausted all
possible alternatives. The limited number of alternatives considered might
otherwise be due to either the crisis situation or the limited number of
alternatives available in any event.
Here, several alternatives were in fact available. The Royal Dutch-Shell group
of oil companies are now successfully using chemically treated sand to pull the
oil to the bottom of the ocean from which it is then removed. This alternative
was available in 1967.31 A recent study was made of remedial oil pollution
"The Times (London), April 5, 1967, at 7.
"The Times (London), April 14, 1967, at 6.
"Letter from W.E. Symmers, Counsel for the insurers, to the author, March 31, 1970.
"Statement of the British Foreign Office (1930) cited in SMITH, THE LAw AND CUSTOM
SEA 29 (3rd ed. 1959).
"The Times (London), April 14, 1967, at 6.
"Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1970.
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procedures by the International Lake Erie Water Pollution Board of the
International Joint Commission.
This study sets forth four tests of procedures for containment of the oil, and
four tested procedures for actual removal of the oil. All eight of these
procedures were available to the British Government at the time of the Torrey
Canyon casualty. None of the eight alternatives is similar to the remedial
procedures used by the British Government. 32
Accordingly, it is the author's conclusion that the reactions of the British
Government in the Torrey Canyon incident correspond exactly to what might
have been anticipated had a psychological analysis of the situation been made.
In the light of this conclusion, it is possible that had the behavioral sciences
been utilized in a consultative capacity during this crisis, much of the
subsequent property damage and financial loss suffered might have been
avoided.
Obviously that would have affected both the various legal remedies and the
consequences involved. This portion of the study would seem to present a strong
argument for the encouragement of further, psychological research in the
international arena, and the consideration of the behavioral sciences by
international decision makers and their legal counsel during the course of their
decision-making processes.
The last section of the paper deals with an analysis of the role played by, and
the reactions of peripheral international entities in response to the Torrey
Canyon incident, which had various impacts on the legal community. For
purposes of this paper, three organizations are considered: The
Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization of the United Nations;
the American Institute of Merchant Shipping; the International Tanker Owners
Pollution Federation, Ltd. The first organization is a "public" entity organized
as a branch of the United Nations to coordinate international efforts in
maritime matters. The latter two organizations are "private" tanker owners
federations, the first restricted to owners of vessels registered in the United
States of America and the second including members involved in international
tanker operations.
The saliency of the incident to each of these organizations is apparent as it
affects either their primary source of revenue or the primary purpose of their
existence. Similarly, the element of surprise is clear for the incident was not
anticipated. The time period, ranging from two to three years from time of
incident to time of ultimate reaction, is not quite so clear-cut, but is still
sufficient to fall within the realm of the crisis definition. This period is not
usually in the international arena in crisis decision making where the technical
"Potential Oil Pollution Incidents from Oil and Gas Well Activities in Lake Erie-Their
Prevention and Control," A Report of the International Lake Erie Water Pollution Board of the
International Joint Commission, September, 1969.
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work is intricate and detailed and extensive consultations with domestic and
33
foreign parties must be made.
With the definition of crisis satisfied, an analysis of the relevant theories may
be made. This will be approached by considering the organization, first in terms
of what is to be expected from them as organizations, and second, their
anticipated behavior as peripheral actors. The C.F. Hermann article, "Some
Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations," supra, will
be relied upon to provide the principles pertaining to the effects of the
organizational structure.
At pages 66 through 70, the author states, that a crisis will increase the
tendency of members of an organization to exercise withdrawal behavior, will
tend to intensify any inter-group conflicts existing prior to the conflict, will
reduce the total number of channels used for the collection and distribution of
information and will contract authority within the organization, all in inverse
proportion to the precrisis integration of the particular organization.
As regards their roles as peripheral actors, anticipation may be entertained
that any changes caused by the crisis such as new alignments and patterns will
be more effective and important in the long run than any of the on-the-spot
decisions made by the British Government. It is also to be anticipated that the
role of peripheral actors, such as these international organizations, will be
minimal during the upswing phase of a crisis and their influence will not
increase or be felt until the crisis confrontation becomes full blown in physical
terms. 34

In light of the above, we can anticipate that there would be growing conflicts
within the organizations, a reduction of assimilation and gathering of
information regarding the crisis, a tendency toward contraction of authority in
the organization, a tendency of the members of an organization to exhibit
withdrawal behavior, formation of new and more effective international
relations, and a reaction only after the crisis had presented itself in a physical
confrontation.
The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization actually
became much more active as opposed to its members exhibiting withdrawal
symptoms as would otherwise have been anticipated by application of
behavioral science techniques. Various work committees were established to
study and draft two long-term international conventions to provide: (1) right of
intervention of endangered coastal states, 35 and (2) strict liability for future
pollution accompanied by a requisite form of insurance similar to the financial

33
Kelman, op. cit., supra note 22, at 441-42.
3
0.R. YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF FORCE, at 64-146 (Princeton University Press, 1968).
35International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution

Casualties, Art. VIII (1), United Nations.
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responsibility law of motor vehicle statutes, 36 and (3) a proposed International
Pollution Fund to compensate victims of pollution where the damage exceeds
the insurance coverage. 37
All of the above will have considerable impact on the legal profession and on
future incidents of this nature. No conflicts were found among the members as
all were in apparent agreement as to the desirable steps to take to prevent future
loss. In fact, not only were the number of information collection channels
maintained, but several were added for the various work committees involved.
The organization did not become more centralized in authority, but authority
was delegated to the various work committees to study the draft of the proposed
convention. 38
Obviously, the convention proposed by the IMCO and adopted by the United
Nations will have a much greater long-range effect in the international arena
than will any of the abortive actions taken by the British Government. Further,
the actions taken by the IMCO did not occur until after the physical
confrontation had been made in the Torrey Canyon incident.
Curiously enough, the actions and reactions of the private International
Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, Ltd. followed exactly those discussed
above, in the context of the IMCO. The exception is that here the organization,
and its work committees, were involved in drafting a private agreement to be
signed by all international tanker owners as opposed to an international
convention which would be signed by the sovereign nations.
As of 1969, it had been signed by: B.P. Tanker Company Limited, Esso
Transport Company Inc., Gulf Oil Corporation, Mobile Oil Corporation, Shell
International Petroleum Company Limited, Standard Oil Company of
California, and Texaco, Inc. It is also of interest that almost every clause of the
private agreement is analogous to the provisions of the international convention.
Accordingly, with the reactions being identical it would be redundant to
reiterate the analysis of the response of this particular organization. 39
The American Institute of Merchant Shipping is restricted to owners of
vessels flying the American flag. It did not follow the same type of response as
the two above organizations. It indicates definite withdrawal behavior for it was
formed in January of 1969 as a merger of three long established but overlapping
shipping associations, the American Merchant Marine Institute, the Committee
of American Steamship Lines and the Pacific-American Steamship Association.
3
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Art. IX (6), United
Nations.
"International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, 1969, Report of the Working
Group on the Fund, LEG/CONF/C2/WP45.
3
Letter dated Feb. 18, 1970, from Thomas S. Busha, Deputy Head Legal Division, IMCO, to the
author; report of the Legal Committee on the work of its 7th Session, IMCO, January 12, 1970.
"Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement ConcerningLiability for Oil Pollution, 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 497 (May, 1969).
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The merger was the result of the Torrey Canyon casualty, and was to provide
a more influential and effective American maritime association. Information is
unavailable regarding possible conflicts in this organization or its predecessors.
Here the total number of channels for the collection of information was not
reduced. In fact, they were increased to include a specific committee specifically
to study the Torrey Canyon incident and its relevant issues to supplement the
sources of information it already had in its existent committees.
As the AIMS is the result of the merger of the three prior organizations, it is
readily apparent that a contraction of authority which was otherwise distributed
in the three predecessor organizations has been made in this crisis situation.
Certainly the very purposes for which this organization was formed will serve to
insure that it has a more important effect in the long run than the particular
actions of the British Government in response to the Torrey Canyon incident.
The merger of the three parent organizations into the organization was not
initiated until after the physical confrontation had been realized in the Torrey
Canyon incident. 40
The first two organizations considered would appear to be exceptions to the
expected types of reactions set forth in the Hermann article, supra. The
example of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping, of course, would
verify the theories pronounced by Hermann. All examples seem to support
Young's analysis of the expected behavior of peripheral actors. Part of the
difficulty with Hermann's projections may be that he places his analyses in the
context of an inverse proportion to precrisis organizational integration as
opposed to an absolute rule. Accordingly, if the organization, as were the first
two, is thoroughly integrated prior to the crisis, the reactions announced by
Hermann will be negligible or non-existent. The last organization, which
obviously lacked precrisis integration, clearly supports Hermann's views.
It must be emphasized that the three private reactions described are not
exclusive. In Tokyo, the Japanese cabinet approved a motion to limit the
dumping of oil by tankers within 50 miles of the coast, and if the vessel in
question exceeds 20,000 tons, the ship would be totally prohibited from
dumping in any waters. The U.S., at the request of the President, immediately
formed the National Multi-Agency Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution
Contingency Plan which establishes a pattern for a coordinated response among
the Departments of the Interior, Transportation, Defense and Health,
Education and Welfare, and the Office of Emergency Planning. 4 1 These
reactions have not been studied from a behavioral science perspective, but such

"0All About AIMS, American Institute of Merchant Shipping, October, 1969.
"The Third Report of the President to the Congress on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development, Marine Science Affairs-A Year of Broadened Participation (January, 1969), p. 122.
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consequences could certainly have been anticipated by astute counsel armed
with behavioral science tools, and perhaps influenced by timely advice.
It is the author's conclusion that the consistency between the behavioral
science projections of the expected international reactions, and the actions as
they in fact did occur, is nothing short of startling. It bears out the potential
significance of the behavioral sciences to the political arena and the legal
profession, and clearly speaks for encouragement of implementation of
psychological and sociological techniques, in legal and political international
decision making.
Recognition of behavioral tendencies can be very useful at the time of
decision making and in prosecuting or defending claims after such decisions
have been made. In fact, such an integration of the disciplines may already be
taking place on a greater scale than before. Senator Fullbright stated on June 5,
1969:
It is by no means clear that the tested insights of psychology and anthropology are
readily applicable to current political problems. It is possible however that these
developing sciences have reached, or are approaching, a level of achievement at which
they can provide those of us who have responsibility for practical policy making with
valuable insights into our own motives and behavior as well as those of other countries
with whom we have dealings. 4 2

2

Hearings before the Committee on ForeignRegulations United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st

Sess., Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy, at 1, June 5, 19-20, 1969.
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